bolder insurgents. This recent exposure to a new level of operational stress puts the German armed forces under added pressure to learn and adapt to a counter-insurgency environment. As in the United States and Britain, mid-level officers are bringing back valuable experiences and lessons from their tours.
The result of these two contrary but related trends is stalemate. On the one hand, an already sceptical Bundestag is under pressure from the public to scale back Germany's contribution, pressure that is also strongly felt among senior civilian and military leaders in the ministry of defence. On the other hand, the executive branch, particularly the chancellery and the foreign office, is feeling allied pressure to pull more weight, and field commanders in Afghanistan are determined to face up to a bolder enemy just as NATO's other fighting armies are. In the absence of strong and charismatic leadership in the field of security policy, the result is inertia: no matter the outcome of coalition negotiations, Germany's Afghanistan policy is poised to remain on its present track, with only modest adjustments. Berlin will, by default, react to Washington's strategic lead, though it will not necessarily do what the Obama administration wants it to. This passivity is remarkable given that Germany's stakes in Afghanistan are potentially even higher than those of the United States: continued violence and occupation in Afghanistan will fuel Muslim radicalisation in Europe more than in America. As Afghanistan backfires, Europe will be hit harder. of German police trainers was supposed to reach 100, but it has proved difficult to fill this many positions. 4 Seen against the background of a heavy administrative structure, the number of German police boots on the ground is worryingly small; moreover, these officers rarely leave their secure compounds, focusing In all areas -diplomacy, economic aid, police training and military support -Germany has significantly increased its commitment in the last
Germany in Afghanistan
year. Yet, mostly because of a deteriorating security situation, it is the security sector and the military component that matter most. And it is also in the military sphere where, in many ways, German legal frameworks and standard operating procedures have to be adapted most urgently. to minimise the use of force and firepower, raising concerns that the card might unreasonably limit troops' ability to react to and shape tactical situations, and that it might even costs lives. Until recently, one item on the card instructed soldiers to warn potential adversaries: 'United Nations -Stop, or I will fire!' To make sure the message got through, the card provided a Pashto translation: 'Melgäro Mellatuna -Dreesch, ka ne se dasee kawumm!' The warning was supposed to be repeated if necessary. Until April 2009 German ISAF forces were allowed to use force only in self-defence, when under fire.
Legal limitations
As a result, during a commando raid a few months earlier, German Special
Operations Forces could do nothing but watch a high-value target slip away:
the insurgent managed to evade a capture operation by breaking through a security cordon around a building -and only a sniper could have stopped the fleeing man, which the rules of engagement at that time did not permit.
The pocket card's phrasing, and suggested adaptations to operational realities, have been discussed at the highest levels of German politics. The result is that soldiers are confused and uncertain not only about operational risks, but about the legal risks they are taking in combat situations.
A second example makes this clear: the routine involvement of a public prosecutor, the Staatsanwaltschaft, in military affairs. Whenever a civilian abroad, of any nationality, is killed in a situation involving a German soldier, the public prosecutor starts an investigation into the incident. Usually the Germany. This meant they had to leave by mid afternoon during the Afghan November. As a result, Norwegian units were forced to retreat from the front lines every day, making it impossible to tie down insurgent forces. German soldier to be killed in a fire-fight, an action in which nine others were also wounded. Franz Josef Jung, the defence minister, publicly warned that the Taliban was eyeing the upcoming German federal elections and would be trying to influence public opinion. As of 24 August, 33 German soldiers had lost their lives in Afghanistan, and each casualty is highly publicised in Germany.
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In the past, US and German intelligence services have repeatedly warned that the Taliban would try to influence the decisions of the German parliament.
Such an attempt could have some chance of success, as German public support for the operation in Afghanistan is shaky. Asked whether the mission was 'wrong' or 'right', 62% of Germans replied that it was wrong that their army was stationed in Afghanistan. 11 When the Bundestag voted to extend the mandate in 2008 from 3,500 to 4,500 soldiers, polls showed that 74% of Germans were against this, with only 23% in favour. 12 In a remarkable poll in 2008, one question inquired whether Germany should do more in the campaign against terror if a newly elected President Barack
Obama asked them to; 79% said 'no' and only 14% 'yes'. 13 In a Forsa poll,
58% of respondents wanted Germany to end the Bundeswehr operation in
Afghanistan and withdraw, while only 36% supported a continuation of the ISAF operation. Indeed, the Bundeswehr's efforts in Afghanistan are not seen by the German electorate as defensive acts, but rather as a reconstruction and stabilisation effort. Germany is not taking part in the operation to serve its own interests, but because it carries part of the international community's responsibility to fix a damaged country. This ambiguity is reflected in the government's treatment of the word Krieg. 'War' is a loaded word in German.
It still triggers memories of large-scale invasions, air-raid sirens and bombs raining down on major cities. The notion that Krieg should somehow be in the interest of the population among whom it is waged, a central notion of US counter-insurgency doctrine, has no resonance in Germany. Yet most Germans, despite the defence minister's declaration to the contrary, think that the Bundeswehr is engaged in a Kriegseinsatz, a war, not just a humanitarian operation. The government argues that Germany is engaged in humanitarian self-defence, whereas the population questions how the war is tied to the national interest. 16 Still, things are changing slowly: even Jung, the defence minister, has started to refer to combat fatalities as Gefallene, or fallen, an equally heavy term in German. And on 6 July 2009 the German government, for the first time since the Second World War, awarded a medal for bravery to four soldiers, modelled on the Iron Cross.
In Germany, a parliamentary system with strong federal elements But the conservatives' own position is more complex than meets the eye.
The German right is, at first glance, in favour of the operation and eager to ensure that Afghanistan does not turn into a launching pad for global terrorism. Upon closer inspection, however, the picture is more nuanced.
Afghanistan is not Iraq, conservatives argue, and the template of a 'surge'
may not work there. The country is ethnically more complex, has no secular tradition, no resources or industrial base, no functioning and stable institutions, and little human capital. The goals of the Afghan operation are still seen as far too ambitious. The CDU's foreign-policy experts understand very well that talking to and co-opting 'conservative elements' in Afghanistan would mean that many girls could no longer attend school -a symbolic political issue in Germany. But more than that, some CDU politicians agree that Die Linke has a point: a number of conservative politicians privately concede that Afghanistan might be making Germany less secure, not more. Of all ISAF's five Regional Commands, the northern region was thought to be the most stable. This was mainly because the region's population is largely non-Pashtun and enjoys a relatively consolidated power structure.
The north was the traditional power base of the Northern Alliance, the anti- Some Germans started to believe that the situation in their area was better because the Bundeswehr's approach was less trigger-happy than that of their allies in southern areas. Hans-Ulrich Klose, a senior Social Democrat, reflected the view of many Germans when he suggested that 'America has contributed to a deteriorated situation in the south' 23 -implying that Germany had avoided a similar mistake in the north. But the insurgency is slowly creeping northwards and instability is affecting the north as it is the rest of the country. As some allies have occasionally felt compelled to remind their German colleagues, the north was never more secure because the Germans were there, but rather the Germans were in the north because it was more secure. This is no longer the case.
In The rate of combat fatalities has increased significantly. ISAF has reacted by readjusting its operational focus and enhancing its combat capabilities.
Previously, the pattern of operational conduct in the north was limited pre- In short, increasing troop numbers and strengthening capabilities on the ground will not be easy.
A focus on numbers should not distract from a second shortcoming of To tie more of these crucial combat resources to the Afghan operation would deny German authorities the option to provide forces for NATO or EU operations elsewhere. Secondly, to do more would require political willingness to order the military to shift its operational focus towards counter-insurgency, and to enable the army to do so by providing the necessary political and legal backing. In particular, the next mandate for ISAF would need to tackle the issue of legal limitations. As a next step, the structures for inter-agency cooperation would need to be drastically reformed both in the field and in Berlin. Finally, the necessary resources for the Afghan operation would have to be made available. All of this would demand a serious effort, and it is doubtful that Afghanistan will be high enough on the political agenda of the next German administration to bring this about.
Doing less, however, is also politically difficult, at least in the interna- The negative scenario is a major terrorist attack against German targets, either in Afghanistan or, worse, in Germany. There is no real way to prepare the population for a terrorist incident, and perhaps even politicians would find it difficult to cope: 'The political elite is not prepared for a terrorist attack', fears one senior official in the chancellery. 28 Yet leaders across all parties are worried by the prospect of a terrorist incident in Germany or a successful major military operation by Taliban insurgents in northern
Afghanistan. Their fear is that Germany might end up losing its will to fight as a result, of course only after a face-saving salvo of defiant statements in the face of terror.
Germany, in short, is trying to maintain a low profile by hiding politically behind bolder allies, rhetorically behind 'networked security' (a vague 29 The European Union is, for many reasons, more affected by this recoil effect than the United States, and consequently, its stakes are higher in Afghanistan. The longer a protracted occupation of large swathes of Afghanistan drags on, the more palpable and immediate the costs will be, while at the same time, the potential benefits will appear ever more vague and unrealistic. 30 Keeping a low profile and reluctantly, if devotedly, following a sometimes strategically short-sighted American ally makes it more difficult for Berlin's decision-makers to shape the crucial debate about a new strategy for Afghanistan.
